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Are We Responsible for 
Our Emotions and Moods? 
MICHAEL SCHLEIFER AND MIRIAM MCCORMICK 
"For a moment I thought I was going to cry-but I didn't cry, 
although I kept on wanting to" 
(Pixie, Chapter 9, Episode 2, lines 8-10). 
lthough the Philosophy for Children approach has 
always emphasized the development of thinking and 
logic, it has also always acknowledged the 
importance of children's feelings. It is only quite recently, 
however, that there has been more of a concentration on the 
affective aspect. The importance of a caring fonn of thinking 
was stressed by the founders of the program from the outset, 1 
and some emotions like love, fear, and hope appear in the 
original novels,2 sometimes used as terms by the children, 
sometimes implicit in the situation, as in the quote about 
sadness cited above. There are also contexts where empathy 
is relevant, particularly in Pixie and Lisa3• Empathy, let us 
note, however, is not restricted to feelings; it refers to one's 
ability to put oneself in another's shoes in regards to their 
thoughts, perspectives, and points of view as well as their 
emotions, motives, attitudes and moods.4 In the original P4C 
curriculum, there is very little concentration on helping 
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children understand the emotions themselves. Furthermore, 
when there is some suggested discussion in the 
accompanying guides, it often is centered upon the contrast 
between appeal to emotions and appeal to logic.5 
The more recent use of P4c to directly impact on 
emotions has stimulated the creation of new materials,6 as 
well as a theoretical foundation for linking philosophical 
discussion with emotional intelligence.7 This new focus 
acknowledges the need to talk about feelings with children, 
to help them reflect upon their own emotions, and those of 
others. This is needed not only for somewhat complex 
emotions like hope, pride, guilt, shame, and jealousy, but 
even for the so-called basic ones of sadness, anger, fear, and 
joy, disgust and surprise. Research has shown that many 
children (and even many adults ) remain confused about 
their emotions. 8 Furthe1more, there is an important link 
between this confusion (particularly in regard to anger, 
sadness and fear) and acts ofviolence.9 Thus, a concentration 
on the prevention of violence has been one of the important 
aspects of recent attempts to educate about emotions. There 
is some evidence from work that we and others have done, 
that philosophical discussions with children will help them in 
their comprehension of at least the four most basic emotions, 
(sadness, fear, anger and joy) as well as the development of 
their moral autonomy, judgment, and at least one cognitive 
component of empathy. 10 
The short answer to the question in the title of this paper 
is "yes." Our thesis is that we are indeed responsible for our 
emotions and moods.We want to help children understand 
that just as they are responsible for what they do and say, or 
omit to do or say (along with the consequences of these 
acts), so are they responsible for much of their affective life. 
What remains is to explain what we mean by "responsi-
bility," "emotions," and "moods." 
16 
What is "responsibility"? 
We want our children to be responsible. What do we 
mean by this? Responsibility is a complicated concept, with 
moral, legal and psychological components. 11 For the 
purposes of this paper, there is one main question to ask-
namely, what is the value we want as parents and teachers to 
impart to our young children? In order to answer, we will 
sum up much of the philosophical and legal literature in the 
following way: Responsibility is "answering for ~what vve 
do." We can see 




account for our 
acts is what we 
have in mind: we 
want our children 
to understand that 
they are the 
authors of what 
they do, that when 
they do things that 
are bad, it may be 
appropriate to 
blame them 
(i.e., they are 
blameworthy), and 
when they do 
good things, they 
may deserve credit 
or praise (i.e., they 
are praiseworthy). 
We want them to 
understand that 
some things are 
done by them, some by other people, and that sometimes the 
causes are either natural or unknown. At the very earliest 
age, we identify our children by giving them a name, and 
then using this name when referring to their space, their 
possessions or their body (Mary's room, Mary's teddy-bear, 
Mary's nose), as well as to their actions (Mary is walking, 
Mary is kissing, Mary is throwing a tantrum, Mary hurt her 
finger). We are reminding her that it is not daddy or her 
brother who is walking, kissing, throwing a tantrum or 
whose finger is hurt. 
Personal identity and autonomy, two components of 
responsibility, make their appearance in very early 
childhood. The child, even before speaking, is aware of his 
accomplishments (walking is a great example), and we (and 
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the child) are proud of this developmental milestone. As 
every parent and early educator knows, the two-year old 
insists on doing things for himself, and will persevere at a 
task for a very long time to get it done. It is often frustrating 
that the young child will refuse assistance in putting on his 
clothes. As good parents, we have learned to balance our 
wish to have our child develop this important earl¥ 
autonomy, but also to help him when it is needed-for his 
safety, or even because we are in a rush and can't afford the 
luxury of waiting for him to put on his own shoes. We, of 









children to "take 
responsibility" for 
what they do. As 





does not entail 
being able to do 
otherwise than 
what one has 
done. Whether or 





responsibility, even if it remains crucial in determining 
aspects of moral and legal responsibility. We can 
acknowledge that there are things we did (or omitted to do), 
which we could not have avoided doing( or failing to do). 
We may regret the consequences of some act, and want to 
apologize to people we may have hurt. We may, however, be 
practically certain that in the relevant circumstances, if 
offered the chance to go back again (perhaps by time-travel) 
we would still have acted in the same way. The act remains 
ours forever. Whether or not we are to be blamed (or praised) 
by others, and to what degree, is one matter. Our sense of 
being accountable to ourselves for our own acts is another. 
The entire area of excuses, both in the law, as well as in 
morality, is relevant to questions of blameworthiness, and 
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circumstances may determine degrees of appropriate praise. 
Although all of this pertains to responsibility in the sense of 
accountability to others, none of it will determine one's own 
accountability (we may feel differing degrees of guilt, but 
that is a separate matter). This is another way of stating our 
thesis; taking responsibility is independent of whether or to 
what degree we are morally or legally responsible. For 
children, "I couldn't help it" or "he made me do it" will have 
an impact on one issue (that of moral responsibility, 
including possible blame or punishment) but not on the other 
(acknowledging that it was their act, for which they must 
take responsibility) . 
Four further conceptual points: 1) We are speaking of 
responsibility as it occurs in its prepositional sense-
responsibility for something. There are uses of the concept 
which are subsidiary, as in "drink responsibly" ( meaning 
perhaps, "drink in moderation"), or simply "be responsible" 
(which often means, "be trustworthy," or "be mature"); 
2) Responsibility refers not only to negative acts, as in 
crimes, bad behaviors, and other aspects for possible blame 
and punishment. We must include good acts, good 
consequences, and the entire area of possible praise and 
reward; 3) Our concept of responsibility is not equivalent to 
blameworthiness, or praiseworthiness, but is to be defined 
independently of these. Of course, if a person is judged 
causally and morally responsible for something, it will make 
them a prime candidate for further questions of blame, 
praise, punishment, or reward, if these become relevant; 
4) Finally, we are ignoring questions of collective and 
vicarious responsibility, where either groups of people, in the 
first case, or perhaps a parent in place of a child in the 
second, may be judged "responsible." For the purpose of this 
paper, we are restricting ourselves to the individual person 
who will be uniquely responsible for the act, the omission of 
an act, or the consequences of these. What we are arguing is 
that the same responsibility must be extended to both 
emotions and moods. 
Emotions 
What are "emotions"? One way of seeing what emotions 
are, is to say what they are not. They are not just desires, 
impulses, or motives-the things which may push us to action. 
They are different also from hunger and thirst, our two main 
appetites. Hunger is always about food, thirst always about 
drink. In contrast, emotions like love can have as object any 
number of people, or by extension pets, books, music and so 
on. Nor can emotions be reduced to desires and passions, 
including sexual desire. Emotions are not pleasure and pain, 
although, of course, they may involve both these sensations. 
Attitudes, dispositions and moods are all causally and 
conceptually tied to emotions, although they have their own 
unique features (more on moods below). Having said what 
emotions are not, let us try a positive description. 
17 
The best way of summing up a vast amount of 
philosophical and psychological literature of the last thirty 
years is to say: "Emotions are about something in the world." 
If we ask ourselves what we naturally call emotions, we 
would give quite a long list that would include fear, anger, 
joy, sorrow, grief, jealousy, pity, shame, guilt, pride, hope, 
wonder, love, hate, and the like. What sort of criterion 
underlies this selection? The connection is that all these 
emotions are forms of cognition; they are sometimes called 
"appraisals." All emotions involve seeing situations under 
certain aspects which are agreeable or disagreeable and 
beneficial or harmful in a variety of dimensions. To feel fear 
is, for instance, to see a situation as dangerous. To feel pride 
is to see with pleasure something as mine, or as something 
that I have had a hand in bringing about. Martha Nussbaum 
argues that emotions should be understood as "upheavals of 
thought." By her definition, "Emotions are judgments in 
which people acknowledge the great importance, for their 
own flourishing, of things that they do not fully control-and 
acknowledge thereby, their neediness before the world and 
its event." 13 She reminds us that emotions are "like other 
beliefs" and can be "true or false." 14 We have defended this 
point of view elsewhere, and argued that we are responsible 
for our beliefs. 15 
For the purpose of the present paper, we accept the 
cognitivist analysis of emotion sketched above. The essential 
point in our view, which follows Aristotle, the Stoics, and 
Nussbaum, is that emotions are a form of judgment. It is 
only fair, however, to mention that there is an opposing 
group of philosophers who insist that emotions should be 
primarily defined not in terms of cognition, but rather in 
terms of physiological changes and tendencies to action. 16 
There is no consensus about whether emotions are 
uniquely human, or whether other animals have emotions as 
well. The Stoics, as Nussbaum points out, were convinced 
that no animal could have any emotion. Nussbaum herself, 
along with philosopher and dog-owner George Pitcher, 17 
argue (we think persuasively) that some animals display 
grief, anger and love. There seems also to be a modern 
consensus among philosophers and psychologists as to the 
emotion of fear. Every creature seems to have fear built into 
whatever brain it possesses. It is no doubt for this reason 
that most of the recent ground-breaking research on the 
physiology of emotion has concentrated on the emotion of 
fear. 18 In our view, disgust (often listed along with surprise, 
anger, fear, sadness, and joy as basic emotions with universal 
facial expressions) is probably uniquely human. We certainly 
take emotions like pride and hope to be uniquely human. 
18 
This is because there are, we think, elements of thought 
involved of a kind only humans are capable of. Among other 
concepts necessary to these emotions are a consciousness of 
time-of past and future-something only people seem to be 
capable of. Pride is about things we have judged to have 
done in the past which we conside.r due to certain effort, and 
as an accomplishment. Hope involves expectations about the 
future, along with certain associated fears. 
To illustrate our point of view concerning responsibility for 
emotions, we will consider two examples. The first concerns 
gratitude, the second apology and regret. Although some might 
want to contend that animals have these emotions in some 
sense, we are using them in a way which is uniquely human. 
Gratitude and regret are linked to the past, to a histmy, and thus 
like pride, shame and hope, require the ability to conceptualize 
time. The gratitude example (see below) is mentioned by 
Fischer and Ravissa in their book Responsibility and Control. 
They contend that their analysis of moral responsibility for acts, 
omissions, and consequences, should in theory be extended to 
the realm of emotions. They do not provide the extension 
themselves, but challenge others to provide the demonstration. 
In brief, their position is that responsibility involves a form of 
control called "guidance control." One can have done, or 
omitted to do something without other kinds of control, and still 
remain morally responsible, provided that one has been the 
author of the act. An example of absence of even guidance 
control would be a person doing something (bad or good) 
because an electrode has been implanted in their brain, and the 
acts are controlled by mad scientists in a laboratory. Here the 
absence of even "guidance control" would eliminate all causal 
and moral responsibility. These philosophical mind-experiments 
are stimulating and important, although film portrayals of 
similar cases (for example The Manchurian Candidate) show 
that the protagonist may continue to have guilt, blame himself, 
and take responsibility for the violent act, even when the 
violence seems entirely controlled by the brain implant. 
Leaving aside the complexities of their analysis and 
these science-fiction examples, we want to focus here on the 
question of emotion. Fischer and Ravissa consider an 
objection to their thesis by Robert Adams in an article 
entitled "Involuntary Sins." In brief, Adams argues, against 
Fischer and Ravissa, that we are morally responsible for 
emotions independent of questions of voluntariness, or, for 
that matter, any fmm of control. The important example 
concerns gratitude: 
Suppose you have just realized that you are 
ungrateful to someone who has done a lot for you-
perhaps at a great cost to herself. Far from 
responding to her sacrifices with love and gratitude, 
you have made light of them in your own mind; and 
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if the truth be told, you actually resent them, 
because you hate to be dependent on others, or 
indebted to them. Surely this attitude is 
blameworthy. 19 
We want to assert, with Adams, that we are morally 
responsible for our emotion of gratitude (or, as in this case, its 
absence). There are things that we can do to improve our state 
of mind; we can acknowledge the lack of relevant emotion, 
and make some effort towards feeling it appropriately. It is not 
a question of faking the emotion, nor simply of working on 
behavior (for example, expressing gratitude). It is directly 
concerned with the emotion itself. In the sense of 
responsibility outlined above, we are responsible for our 
emotion of gratitude, just as we would be responsible for an 
act, an omission, or a consequence. An important aspect of 
moral education is to make children aware of when and why 
gratitude is fitting, and to discuss why one does not have the 
emotion where it may be appropriate. With Adams, and 
against Fischer and Ravissa on this point, we are extending the 
full concept of responsibility to the realm of emotions. 
Our second example comes from the area of apology 
and regret. We have argued elsewhere,20 as have others,21 that 
moral educators must stress genuine apologies, which can 
lead, in turn, to forgiveness by the person who has been 
wronged. We may, however, reflect about something we have 
done, and not bring ourselves to feel the regret which could 
lead to a genuine apology. We may, futihermore, think that it 
would be more appropriate if we really did feel regret about 
what we said, did, or omitted to say or do. We can resolve to 
take steps to work on feeling the emotion of regret, and feeling 
the need to apologize (not simply mouth the words, or fake it). 
With both the gratitude and regret examples, we feel 
that an important task for moral education (teachers, parents, 
child-care workers) is to impart the need to take 
responsibility for one's emotion. One can find a way, 
appropriate to the age-level of the child, to discuss the 
concept, talking abut "thank you" in the first example, and 
"son-y" in the second. One can, and should, begin this 
discussion at very early ages, certainly during the preschool 
years (ages two to five). Partly because of Piaget and others, 
we have seriously underestimated the competence of young 
children, and their ability to comprehend these matters. 
Research over the last twenty years has shown that, contrary 
to Piaget, by the age of five the child is very sophisticated in 
his understanding of questions of responsibility. 22 
The quote from Pixie at the beginning of this paper 
raises the issue of control or regulation of emotion. Pixie is 
wanting to cry, but cannot. Here we have the fascinating and 
complex issue of what is voluntary or controllable about one's 
sadness, and how this compares with other human activities 
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and states of mind. Whether or not, to 
what degree, and in what way, emotions 
can be controlled is an important matter, 
not directly relevant to taking responsibility 
for one's emotions, as we have argued 
above. Nevertheless, the question of 
control can and should be talked about. In 
order to lead discussions on these matters, 
one has to take into consideration some of 
the complex and often conflicting 
information available-much of it quite 
recent-from brain research. 
On the one hand, recent research on 
the "emotional brain" performed by 
Joseph Ledoux and popularized by Daniel 
Goleman,23 has shown that certain basic 
emotions like fear and anger are much too 
rapid to be controlled by any person. The 
amygdala reacts in 12 milliseconds, 
independently of any cortical connections. 
On the other hand, there are techniques 
which can be used to control duration, 
intensity, and some manifestations of fear 
and anger, as Goleman and others have 
shown. With fear and anger, there is 
inevitably some part of the process which 
cannot be controlled by most people 
(mainly bodily and brain), but there are 
things one can do about anticipating 
circumstances, and regulating expressions 
and manifestations in verbal and non-
verbal behaviour. Virtually all of the brain 
research alluded to here was done with 
rats, and has concentrated on fear, 
whereas most of the work on regulation 
among humans has focused on anger. Whether, and to what 
degree any of this applies to sadness-or any other 
emotion-remains a question for further research. We are 
willing to affirm at the moment that in regard to emotions 
like gratitude and regret, talking about control may be 
inappropriate and misleading. In any case, our main thesis is 
that we are responsible for our emotions, independently of 
issues of control. We must take responsibility and take 
control whether or not any kind of control was present at the 
moment of the original occurrence. 
Moods 
Perhaps the most contentious of our suggestions is that 
children are responsible not only for their emotions, but also 
for their moods. This is in part because there is some 
19 
philosophical consensus, as we have noted above, that 
emotions are linked to judgments and beliefs. We have 
argued elsewhere that we are responsible for our beliefs,24 
and that argument might help convince some, otherwise 
doubtful, that taking responsibility for emotions is 
appropriate. When talking about good or bad moods, 
however, the argument for responsibility is more difficult. 
This is because moods (irritability, grumpiness, euphoria,_ 
some kinds of depression) are contrasted conceptually with 
emotions, precisely on the basis that they are often not linked 
to beliefs, not about something in the world. Martha 
Nussbaum has highlighted this emotion-mood distinction in 
her book Upheavals of Thought. We accept her distinction, 
although we have argued elsewhere that emotions and moods 
are more closely linked-both causally and conceptually-
than she allows.25 Two areas where we consider Nussbaum's 
20 
analysis to have failed pertain to sadness/ depression, and the 
effect of music. 
"Mood" is defined in Webster's as: 
1) a conscious state of mind or predominant emotion 
2) a prevailing attitude ; a disposition 
3) a receptive state of mind predisposing to action 
4) a distinctive atmosphere 
or context ; an "aura." 
AJ.1 hcu;f ff. 
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regard, Nussbaum's term "upheaval" might do the work of 
"affect," although it is not as widely used, particularly in the 
clinical setting. We can retain that part ofNussbaum's 
analysis which reminds us that moods tend to refer to 
emotional states, often with a vague or undetermined object, 
whereas emotions tend to refer to something in the world 
' 
All four definitions capture 
some of what we mean by 
"mood," in everyday language, in 
our ordinary experience, as well 
as in the clinical context. 2) refers 
to the use of the term in such 
i;.vh es 1 'f ! !U 
phrases as "Are you in the 
mood?"; 3) could refer to "Is the 
boss in a good or a bad mood?" 
The first definition actually 
mentions emotions, which on 
Nussbaum's analysis would be a 
mistake. However, as we have 
argued, emotions and moods are, 
in fact, paii of a special 
experience, which we can call 
"affect." Although Nussbaum 
objects to this suggested term, her 
objection is on the grounds that it 
is too wide, encompassing 
interests, attitudes, and for others, 
even appetites, desires, and 
motivations.26 We agree that 
appetites and desires are, as 
Nussbaum contends, different 
from "affect," and that 
motivation, attitudes, and 
interests should also, for different 
reasons, be separated 
conceptually from emotions. We 
suggest, however, that emotions 
and moods be seen as aspects of 
the same umbrella state of mind. 
Calling this state "affect" is not 
too misleading if we take the 
dictionary definition: "the 
conscious subjective aspect of an 
emotion considered apart from bodily changes." This accords 
well with common usage, and also with what is presently 
known about the emotional brain.27 
We have proposed, therefore, as a conceptual revision of 
Nussbaum's position, that emotions and moods be seen as 
somewhat different species of a generic "affect." In this 
which we judge and value as important. However, as shown 
above, the overlap is too great (particularly when one 
includes the "background" emotions) to insist, as Nussbaum 
does, that emotions and moods be too sharply separated. We 
all learn, as children, and later as adults, to notice our moods 
and those of others. They are invariably intertwined with the 
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standard emotions. Being in a good mood will necessarily 
involve the "positive" emotions of joy, wonder, jocularity, 
jubilance and others. On the other side, our bad moods refer, 
by necessity, to not only sullenness, grumpiness, irritability, 
gloominess and the like, but also to anger, indignation, 
sadness, fear, guilt, resentment, and other specific emotions. 
Moods and emotions are in many turbulent lives part of 
the same roller coaster. Moods may cause emotions and vice 
versa. On moods influencing emotions, there is an interplay 
of temperament (how moody people are), how prepared they 
are for the onset of the moods, and what steps they may have 
taken, or not taken, to control these moods. If one is in a 
somewhat depressed mood, one will more likely to react with 
greater sadness, anger, or fear and anxiety to situations in the 
real or imagined world. Literature, art and music, along with 
dramatic events in the everyday world will have more of an 
emotional effect depending upon the state of mood. In my 
own case, a book, movie, or play, with themes of death, 
illness, unrequited love, or loss of memory will awaken 
strong emotions; these will invariably be stronger ifI am in a 
"down" mood rather than an "up" one. 
In the opposite causal direction, emotions can cause 
moods. For example, when one hears of an event like a 
suicide bombing, one may ve1y well react with anger, 
sadness, and fear in various combinations and intensities. 
These emotions are about something specific. They relate to 
this situation, and awaken all three negative emotions. They 
also, however, can influence one's mood so that one becomes 
sullen, grumpy, withdrawn, disgruntled, and gloomy. 
Furthermore, these moods may last much longer than the 
initial emotive reactions. Research has also shown that 
'positive' emotions like gratitude can impact upon people's 
moods. These effects have been shown to last up to two 
weeks.28 
We want to assert that children (like adults) must take 
responsibility for their moods, much the same way we have 
agued that they must take responsibility for their emotions. 
Furthermore, because emotions and moods are so often 
intertwined, as we have argued above, we will often need to 
take responsibility for both together. 
NOTES 
1. See M. Lipman," Caring Thinking." lnquilJ' 15,1 (1995). See also 
J.C.L Bernstein, "Caring Thinking." Thinking 16,3 (2003). 
2. Love and friendship are discussed throughout the novelettes Lisa 
and Pixie. The emotions of fear and hope are in Kio and Gus. The 
discussion here mainly focuses on what is reasonable and what is 
unreasonable. See page 244 of the I11structional Manual to Accompany 
Kio and Gus and page 30 from the novelette. 
3. Lisa and her friends discuss whether one can empathize with 
animals. See page 13 of the Instructional Manual to Accompany Lisa 
and page 1-2 of the novelette. Pixie uses the same discussion questions 
in its accompanying manual. 
21 
4. See M. Schleifer and C. Martiny, Talking About Values and Feelings 
·with Young Children: HolV to Develop Good Judgment and Empathy 
(2005, forthcoming, Calga1y: Temeron Press). 
5. As for example, the discussion about the catfish in the 
accompanying manual to Kio and Gus: "Good Reasoning and 
Emotional appeal." See page 402 in The Instructional Manual to 
Accompany Kio and Gus, and p. 55, line 14-16 in the novelette. 
6. Material has been created on the prevention of violence by Ann 
Margaret Sharp and her collaborators as well as by Marie-France. 
Daniel and our research team. Schleifer, M., Daniel, M.-F., Peyronnet, 
E. et Lecompte, S. (2003). 'The Impact of Philosophical Discussions 
on Moral Autonomy, Judgment, Empathy and the Recognition of 
Emotion in Five Year Olds." Thinki11g, vol. 16, no 4, pp. 1-19. 
7. A. Gazzard "What does Philosophy for Children Have To Do With 
Emotional Intelligence?" Tlzi11ki11g 15, 1, (2002) 39-45. 
9. N. Alvarado and K. A. Jameson, "Varieties of Anger: The Relation 
Between Emotion Terms and Components of Anger Expression." 
Motivation and Emotio11 26, 2, (2002), 153-182. 
11. See, for example, J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizzza, Respo11sibility 
and Control (Cambridge University Press 1998); M. Schleifer and C. 
Martiny, Talking About Values and Feeli11gs ~with Young Children 
(Calgary Temeron Press, 2005), ch.5; R.S. Peters, Authority, 
Respo11sibility a11d Education, 3rd edition (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1973); A. Flew, Crime or Disease (New York: Macmillan, 
1973); J. R. Lucas, The Freedom of the Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1970); J. Piaget The Moral Judgme11t of the Child (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1968); T.-R. Shultz, M.Schleifer, and C. Jaggi, 
"Assigning Vicarious Responsibility." European Journal of Social 
Psychology 17 (1987), 377-380; T.-R Shultz, K.Wright, and M. 
Schleifer, "Assigmnent of Moral Responsibility and Punishment." 
Child developme11t, 57 (1986), 177-184; M. Schleifer, T.-R. Shultz, 
M.Lefebvre-Pinard," Judgments of Causality, Responsibility, and 
Punishment in Cases of Hann Due to Omission." British Journal (}f 
Developmental Psychology 1,2 (1983), 87-97; T.-R Shultz, M. 
Schleifer, I. Altman, "Judgments of Causation, Responsibility, and 
Punishment in Cases of Harm-Doing." Canadian Journal of 
Behavioral Science/Revue canadie1111e des sciences du comportement 
13,3 (1981), 238-253; M.Schleifer, "The Responsibility of the 
Psychopath." Philosophy, 45,173 (1970), 231-232. 
19. R. Adams, "Involuntary Sins." Philosophical Review,94,1 
(1985), 3-31. 
20. M. Schleifer, "To Speak or to Keep Silent." Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the British Society for Philosophy of Education, 
Oxford, April 2005. 
21. P. White, "What Should We Teach Children About Forgiveness?" 
Journal of Philosophy of Education 36, 10 (2002), 57-67. 
22. Shultz, Wright, and Schleifer (1986) "Assignment of Moral 
Responsibility and Punishment," op. cit. See also P.E. Bryant, "Piaget, 
Teachers and Psychologists." Oxford Review of Education IO, 3 (1984), 
251-259. 
23. Goleman, op. cit, p. 23. Ledoux op.cit. 
24. See note 15 above. 
25. M. Schleifer, "Moods Emotions and Morality." Paper presented at 
the Western Division meeting of the American Philosophical 
Association, Pasadena, 2003. See also, Schleifer and Martiny, op. cit., 
chapter 7. 
26. Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 61. 
27. Ledoux, op. cit., see note 18 above. 
28. R.A. Emmons and M.E. McCullough, "Counting Blessings Versus 
Burdens: An Experimental Investigation of Gratitude and Subjective 
Well-Being in Daily Life." Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 84, 2 (2003), 377-389. 
